M ost scientists specializing in hurricane studies work primarily to increase their physical understanding of the dynamics and thermodynamics of hurricanes and to improve the ability of meteorologists to forecast a storm's track and intensity. Until recently, only a few of them were involved in research related to climate change, but over the past few years, the topic has received a great deal more attention. Interest in it has been piqued by an increase in North Atlantic hurricane activity.
A comparatively quiet period for hurricanes in the 1970s and 1980s came to an abrupt end with the very tempestuous season of 1995, and since that time, activity has in general been unusually high. Of particular note, in 2004 Florida was struck by no fewer than five named storms, and the 2005 season was the most active on record. The devastation brought about by Hurricane Katrina that summer and the record-breaking intensity of Hurricane Wilma just two months later focused the public's attention on hurricanes.
Questions quickly began to surface. Was global warming contributing to upward shifts in hurricane intensity and frequency? If so, how much of this upsurge could be attributed to human activity? Sea-surface temperatures, known to be important to hurricane strength, had been anomalously high in the tropical Atlantic in recent years. Two articles statistically linking those warm temperatures to hurricane activity appeared around the time of Katrina's landfall: In the August 4 issue of Nature, Kerry Emanuel showed a correlation between Atlantic sea-surface temperatures and what he referred to as the power dissipation index (a measure of storm activity that depends on the frequency, duration and strength of storms). And in the September 16 issue of Science, Peter Webster and colleagues maintained that the number of the most intense hurricanes was increasing-a pattern that also followed rising water temperatures.
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James P. Kossin STORM WORLD: Hurricanes, Politics, and the Battle over Global Warming. Chris Mooney. viii + 392 pp. Harcourt, 2007. $26. especially concerned with rapidly recognizing and classifying items given their observed characteristics, without having to go through a long, complicated chain of reasoning.
In the simplest case of a single artificial perceptron, several real-number inputs represent the values of selected aspects of the observed scene, and an output value (the activation of the perceptron in question), possibly 1 or 0, indicates yes or no. The perceptron takes a weighted sum of the input values and outputs 1, or yes, if the sum is greater than some threshold value; if not, the output is 0. Perceptrons can be arranged in feed-forward networks, so that the output of the first layer goes to perceptrons in the second layer, whose outputs are inputs to a third layer, and so on until a decision is made by a final threshold unit. Given appropriate weights and enough units, a three-layer network can approximate almost any desired way of classifying inputs. Relevant weights do not need to be determined ahead of time by the programmer. Instead, the network can be "trained" to give desired outputs, by making small corrections when the network's response is incorrect.
There are other kinds of connectionist networks. For example, in certain sorts of recurrent networks, the activations of the units settle into a more or less steady state.
Boden describes these developments in loving detail, along with bitter disputes between proponents of proposition-based research and those who favored the connectionist approach. The disagreements were fueled by abrupt changes in U.S. government funding, which are noted in chapter 11. Much of the government money available was provided in the expectation that artificial intelligence would prove to be militarily useful. In the 1980s, funders decided to switch their support from proposition-based artificial intelligence to connectionism. They did so both because of perceived stagnation in the proposition-based approach (mainly due to the difficulties mentioned above), and because connectionism became more attractive with the discovery (or rediscovery) of back-propagation algorithms for training multilayer networks.
More recent developments are described in chapter 13. These include virtual-reality systems, attempts to construct societies of artificial agents that interact socially, and CYC-a project aimed at explicitly representing enough of the commonsense background to enable an artificial system to learn more by reading dictionaries, textbooks, encyclopedias and newspapers. Chapter 14 is a rich account of computational and cognitive neuroscience. Topics touched on include challenges to the computational approach, theories of consciousness and philosophy of mind. In chapter 15, Boden describes the origins of artificial life and then discusses reaction-diffusion equations, self-replicating automata, evolutionary networks, computational neuro-ethology (computational interpretation of the neural mechanisms that underlie the behavior of an animal in its habitat) and work on complex systems. Chapter 16 reviews philosophical thinking about mind as machine. Is there a mind-body problem? If a robot simulation of a person were developed, would it be conscious? Would it suffer from a mind-body problem? Would it be alive? A very brief final chapter lists promising areas for further research. This is, as far as I know, the first fullscale history of cognitive science. I am sure that knowledgeable readers may have various quibbles about one or another aspect of this history (like my own objection above to the discussion of Chomsky's work in linguistics). But I doubt that many, or in fact any, readers will have the detailed firsthand knowledge that Boden has of so much of cognitive science. Future histories of the subject will have to build on this one.
The implicit take-away message from the articles was that global warming was contributing to the increases in ocean temperatures in the Atlantic, which in turn were fueling hurricane activity. These two publications stimulated a significant and often heated scientific debate, which became fodder for the media during the aftermath of Katrina and for the remainder of the hyperactive 2005 season. As public interest in the topic grew, so did the number of scientists taking an interest in the question of whether climate change was behind all this hurricane activity. Hurricane research, previously somewhat provincial, became more global in scope and acquired a new sense of urgency.
The influx of new researchers and the heightened awareness of the social and economic consequences of any increase in the frequency and intensity of storms brought with it a level of debate not previously seen in the community of hurricane scientists. The big questions were these: Is hurricane activity increasing in concert with global temperatures, or are we just witnessing the crest of a natural cycle? And if hurricane activity is in fact increasing as the world warms, just how much of the increase can one pin on anthropogenic influences? Animosity and open hostility sometimes arose between scientists whose positions on these questions differed, and some disparaging statements found their way into the press. At its lowest points, the discussion degenerated into name calling and ad hominem attacks.
In Storm World, journalist Chris Mooney carefully guides the reader through this turbulent sea with a refreshing combination of objectivity and humanity. Like most good stories, this one has its share of interesting characters, and Mooney describes them with evenhandedness and, in many cases, humor. In describing a debate characterized by lines drawn in the sand, Mooney seems to step effortlessly between the two sides, providing a fair and unbiased view of the issues.
The book begins with a brief but accessible introduction to the physics of hurricanes and offers a concise history of the field. Because the science is largely rooted in the mathematical formulations of fluid dynamics but also relies heavily on empiricism to advance understanding and improve forecasting, the field has always had the right ingredients for conflict between scientists from opposing camps. Mooney does an admirable job of describing this longstanding "theory versus empiricism" dichotomy, thereby setting the stage for the more contentious debates in the post-Katrina era.
The remainder of the book is devoted to a nuanced account of the major areas of disagreement over the possible effects of global warming on hurricanes. Much of the controversy has arisen from questions about the accuracy of the historical records of tropical cyclones-a generic term that encompasses the hurricanes of the North Atlantic and Eastern North Pacific and the typhoons of the Western North Pacific as well as the cyclones of the Northern Indian Ocean and the Southern Hemisphere. Various international governmental agencies record the positions and strengths of active tropical cyclones every 6 hours, and then at the end of each year, these records are appended to a historical archive. However, the collection of this data was never designed for the consideration of long-term trends. These records are heterogeneous in that the presence and intensity of storms was measured using the best means available at the time. But because the technology for doing so evolved and improved over the years, time-dependent biases may have crept into the data, resulting in spurious trends that reflect only improvements in technology rather than actual changes in storm frequency or strength.
Although research addressing problems of incompleteness and heterogeneity of the data is progressing rapidly, a high level of uncertainty remains about the accuracy of the long-term records, leaving unsettled the question of whether the apparent upward trend in activity is real. Adding to the challenge, the less eventful 2006 and 2007 North Atlantic hurricane seasons have underscored the random aspect of seasonal hurricane activity. This sort of year-to-year variation makes it more difficult to isolate the long-term trend in the hurricane record, particularly given the brief period for which good data are available.
Also controversial are the theoretical underpinnings of the suggested link between tropical cyclone activity and the reported anthropogenic warming of the tropical oceans. The physical connection between the surface temperature of the sea, which is inching upward globally, and the intensity of the storms that travel over and extract their energy from the warmer waters is only one part of a larger picture. Warming temperatures also affect regional patterns of atmospheric circulation, which in turn affect the number, location, duration and intensity of storms. The fact that climate change affects the circulation patterns as well as sea-surface temperatures makes the connection between hurricanes and climate change much more complicated, and this complexity T he two patron saints of the study of cognitive development (which involves how thinking and knowledge change with age) are the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget and the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky. Both were born in 1896, but Piaget lived and wrote into his 80s, whereas Vygotsky died of tuberculosis at age 37. Both advocated forms of constructivism, the theory that children actively construct knowledge, rather than being passively molded by experience (as in behaviorism) or programmed by biology (as in nativism). However, Piaget viewed cognitive development as a product of the individual mind, achieved through observation and experimentation, whereas Vygotsky viewed it as a social process, achieved through interaction with more knowledgeable members of the culture.
Developmental psychologist Katherine Nelson is an apostle of the Vygotskian approach, known as social constructivism. She is opposed to the currently popular descendant of the Piagetian approach known as theory theory, which holds that children construct causal conceptualizations of different domains of knowledge ("folk theories") using the same cognitive processes that scientists use to construct scientific theories (that is, children think like little scientists).
Nelson contends that theory theorists such as Alison Gopnik commit the psychologist's fallacy-attributing one's own thought processes to others-and thereby forsake one of constructivism's central insights: that children's cognition is qualitatively different from that of adults, not simply quantitatively inferior. In other words, children don't just know less, they think differently.
In her new book, Young Minds in Social Worlds, Nelson also argues that computational theories of mind (based on the premise that the mind operates like a computer) are inadequate, because the ultimate function of human cognition is not to process abstract information, but to interpret experience and share cultural meanings with others. She criticizes evolutionary cognitive psychologists such as Steven Pinker and nativist developmental psychologists such as Elizabeth Spelke for allegedly overemphasizing genetic influences on development and underemphasizing the importance of social and cultural influences. And Nelson draws on developmental systems theory to describe development as a complex, interactive, dynamic process in which cognitive structure gradually emerges, rather than being built into the genes or copied from the environment.
The bulk of the book reviews cognitive and language development during the first five years of life, seen from Nelson's theoretical perspective. Her target audience appears to be other developmental psychologists, as she refers to many theories and studies without giving much explanation for readers not already familiar with them. Developmentalists, however, will not learn much factual information because she presents no new research. Instead, what they may gain is an appreciation of Nelson's theoretical perspective on development, which she calls experiential (to emphasize the importance of the child's individual experience).
Nelson suggests that a child's consciousness develops in levels that correspond to the stages proposed by cognitive neuroscientist Merlin Donald for the evolution of the human mind. Nelson presented this model in more detail in Language in Cognitive Development (1996) , so those who have read that book will find it familiar.
In Young Minds in Social Worlds, the early chapters on cognitive development in the infant and toddler ages are uncontroversial and, frankly, unmemorable. The middle chapters on the acquisition of language and symbols are much more interesting, perhaps because here Nelson can draw more on her own research. She is critical of current theories about word learning that assume that children have the same conceptual structures as adults and simply need to map the words that they hear onto the concepts that they already have. Nelson argues convincingly that children gradually construct concepts through linguistic interaction. In other words, children do not simply match labels to pre-existing categories, but rather use linguistic cues to bring their conceptual boundaries in line with those shared by their linguistic community.
A corollary of this position is that production may sometimes precede comprehension (a reversal of the usually assumed sequence): Children may imitate the use of a word in a particular context and only gradually acquire a context-independent understanding of the meaning of the word. In Nelson's view, which is indebted to the psycholinguist Dan Slobin, language is less than a necessary ingredient for thought itself (that is, nonlinguistic thought is possible), but more than a neutral vehicle for the expression of thought. Language is needed for sharing thoughts, and those thoughts introduces a great deal of uncertainty into efforts to predict the future. This uncertainty is a main source of disagreement between those who say that heightened hurricane activity will endure indefinitely and those who believe that it will continue to rise and fall in a manner that pretty much resembles the pattern of decades past.
Ideally, as evidence mounts and the physical understanding of the problem increases, meteorologists will eventually reach consensus. In the meantime, expect much scientific and political battling. The interplay among science, politics and media coverage is skillfully fleshed out in Storm World, and perhaps most important, the level of uncertainty in this rapidly evolving field is presented in an accurate and nonpartisan manner.
I strongly recommend the book to anyone who is seeking a better understanding of the issues involved or who enjoys a good story with interesting characters. Mooney has crafted a surprisingly accessible book that presents the relevant facts of a complicated issue while being fun to read. 
